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Gao et al. [Phys. Rev. Lett. 101, 208901 (2008)] have described a possible intercept-resend
attack for the quantum protocol for detectable Byzantine agreement in Phys. Rev. Lett. 100,
070504 (2008). Here we describe an extension of the protocol which defeats such attacks.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Pp, 42.50.Dv
Recently [1], Gao et al. have pointed out that there
exists an intercept-resend attack for the quantum proto-
col for detectable Byzantine agreement described in [2].
Here we describe how such attacks alter the entangle-
ment of the distributed multipartite state and thus can
be revealed by further analysis of the acquired data.
The protocol uses the four-photon state
|Ψ(4)〉abcd = 1
2
√
3
(2|0011〉 − |0101〉 − |0110〉 − |1001〉
−|1010〉+ 2|1100〉)abcd, (1)
to distribute lists securely to three parties which then
enable them to achieve the detectable Byzantine agree-
ment.
In [2], step (iii) stated: “C randomly chooses a posi-
tion from his list and asks A and B to inform him about
their results on the same position. If all parties have
measured in the same basis, their results must be suit-
ably correlated.” In the attack proposed in [1], the traitor
intercepts the qubits sent to one of the loyal generals and
performs measurements on them. These measurements
are single-qubit measurements in the {|0〉, |1〉} basis of
eigenstates of the Pauli matrix σz or in the {|0¯〉, |1¯〉} ba-
sis [where |0¯〉 = (|0〉+|1〉)/√2 and |1¯〉 = (|0〉−|1〉)/√2] of
eigenstates of the Pauli matrix σx. Then, the traitor re-
sends the qubits in the state resulting from the previous
measurements to the loyal general. With this method,
the traitor can obtain the other generals’ secret lists
which he can use to mislead the loyal generals into fol-
lowing different plans.
Since the roles of B and C in the protocol in [2] are
symmetrical, there are only three cases to be dealt with:
(I) A (the commanding general) is the traitor and
intercepts, measures, and resends the qubit sent to B
(qubit c).
(II) B is the traitor and intercepts, measures, and
resends the two qubits sent to A (qubits a and b).
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(III) B is the traitor and intercepts, measures, and
resends the qubit sent to C (qubit d).
These attacks indeed do not alter the perfect corre-
lations utilized in the protocol so far. However, they
obviously change the entanglement of the four photon
state and thus the correlations between the results if the
parties measured along different directions. This can be
used to detect the attack. There are several ways to foil
these attacks. Here we present a simple method which
does not require additional measurements and in which
the traitor does not need to announce his actual results.
In the following, we present an example of the method
for each of the three cases.
(I) Suppose that A is the traitor and intercepts and
measures the qubit sent to B in the basis of eigenstates of
σz. In half of the cases, A obtains the result correspond-
ing to |0〉c and resends the state |0〉c to B. Therefore, in
these cases the state of the four qubits is
|Ψ′〉abcd = 1√
6
(−|0101〉 − |1001〉+ 2|1100〉)abcd. (2)
In the other half of the cases, A obtains the result corre-
sponding to |1〉c and resends B the state |1〉c. Therefore,
in these cases the state of the four qubits is
|Ψ′′〉abcd = 1√
6
(2|0011〉 − |0110〉 − |1010〉)abcd. (3)
Therefore, after A’s attack, the state of the four qubits
is the mixed state
ρabcd =
1
2
(|Ψ′〉〈Ψ′|+ |Ψ′′〉〈Ψ′′|)abcd. (4)
Suppose that B and C measure their qubits in the ba-
sis of eigenstates of σx. Then, C asks A and B for
their results. When C checks them, C expects that
〈σ(c)x ⊗σ(d)x 〉Ψ(4) = 13 , which is the prediction for the state
|Ψ(4)〉abcd. However, for the mixed state ρabcd, C finds
〈σ(c)x ⊗ σ(d)x 〉ρabcd = 0.
(II) If B is the traitor and intercepts and measures
qubits a and b in the basis of eigenstates of σz (resulting
2TABLE I: Experimental data showing that an intercept-
resend attack [1] has not occurred in the experiment described
in [2].
Experimental result Result for |Ψ(4)〉abcd
〈σ
(a)
x ⊗ σ
(b)
x 〉 0.262 ± 0.025 1/3
〈σ
(a)
z ⊗ σ
(b)
z 〉 0.273 ± 0.025 1/3
〈σ
(a)
x ⊗ σ
(c)
x 〉 −0.602± 0.021 −2/3
〈σ
(a)
z ⊗ σ
(c)
z 〉 −0.631 ± 0.02 −2/3
〈σ
(a)
x ⊗ σ
(d)
x 〉 −0.612 ± 0.02 −2/3
〈σ
(a)
z ⊗ σ
(d)
z 〉 −0.663± 0.019 −2/3
〈σ
(b)
x ⊗ σ
(c)
x 〉 −0.603± 0.021 −2/3
〈σ
(b)
z ⊗ σ
(c)
z 〉 −0.615 ± 0.02 −2/3
〈σ
(b)
x ⊗ σ
(d)
x 〉 −0.61± 0.02 −2/3
〈σ
(b)
z ⊗ σ
(d)
z 〉 −0.621 ± 0.02 −2/3
〈σ
(c)
x ⊗ σ
(d)
x 〉 0.334 ± 0.025 1/3
〈σ
(c)
z ⊗ σ
(d)
z 〉 0.326 ± 0.024 1/3
in some mixed state ρ′abcd), and A measures qubits a and
b in the basis of eigenstates of σx, then C expects that
〈σ(a)x ⊗ σ(b)x 〉 = 13 but finds 〈σ
(a)
x ⊗ σ(b)x 〉ρ′
abcd
= 0.
(III) If B is the traitor and intercepts and measures
qubit d in the basis of eigenstates of σz , and A and C
measure their qubits in the basis of eigenstates of σx, then
C expects that 〈σ(a)x ⊗ σ(d)x 〉Ψ(4) = 〈σ(b)x ⊗ σ(d)x 〉Ψ(4) = − 23
but finds 〈σ(a)x ⊗ σ(d)x 〉ρ′′
abcd
= 〈σ(b)x ⊗ σ(d)x 〉ρ′′
abcd
= 0.
If C (or the other generals, since they exchange their
roles in the next step) obtains results that do not satisfy
the quantum predictions for the state |Ψ(4)〉abcd, then the
loyal generals decide to abort the protocol; otherwise, the
loyal generals can reach an agreement using the lists.
We show that in the experiment described in [2], ac-
tual experimental data prove that the attack [1] has not
occurred. Table I contains all the tests described above
and those obtained from them by changing σ
(i)
x by σ
(i)
z
for all qubits, exploiting the fact that the state (1) is in-
variant under the same unitary transformation applied
to the four qubits.
In conclusion, there is a simple method that makes the
protocol in [2] secure against the attack proposed in [1].
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